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A SURVEY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
This survey will be divided into four parts. To begin with, we
shall consider the rights of public employees-including free speech.
Continuing on with freedom of speech, we shall discuss some recent
problems involving defamation. Thirdly, we shall look into some as-
pects of obscenity law ("dirty movies at drive-ins"). Last, but by
no means least, we shall exhaustively consider problems involving se-
cured transactions.
I. Public Employees
During the past year, the Seventh Circuit decided five cases deal-
ing with the constitutional problems of dismissed public employees.
To adequately discuss the decisions in these cases, it is first necessary
to review some prior Supreme Court cases dealing with similar prob-
lems.
Briefly, the problem may be initially divided into its substantive
and procedural components:
A. First of all, may a public employee be dismissed for publicly
criticizing his employer? Herein, we look to Pickering v. Board of
Education.1
B. If so, is a dismissed State public employee entitled to the
protection of the fourteenth amendment's right to due process of
law, including notice and a fair hearing? Herein, we look to Board
of Regents v. Roth2 and Perry v. Sindermann.8
A. Substance
Pickering v. Board of Education, quite clearly stands for the prop-
osition that a teacher may not be dismissed for exercising his first
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; B.S., DePaul University,
1958; J.D., DePaul University, 1961; L.L.M. Northwestern University, 1962. The au-
thor acknowledges the highly original contributions of his research assistant, Donald
Fivel Spak, a senior law student at DePaul.
1. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
2. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
3. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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amendment right to speak freely on matters of public concern. Marvin
Pickering, a high school teacher in one of Chicago's suburbs, sent a
letter to a local newspaper to make known his views concerning a pro-
posed tax rate increase after it had been rejected by the voters. The
letter criticized the school board's allocation of funds between the edu-
cational and athletic programs and otherwise attempted to provide an
answer to the board's one-sided campaign for the increase. Although
his letter was greeted by the community "with massive apathy and dis-
belief",4 the Board fired Pickering after a hearing in which it found
(1) that the letter contained numerous false statements and (2) that
the publication of the letter was detrimental to the efficient operation
of the school district.
5
The hearing and dismissal were reviewed by the Will County, Illi-
nois, Circuit Court, which determined only that the Board's findings
were supported by substantial evidence and that the facts were such
that the Board could have reasonably concluded that the letter was
detrimental to the best interests of the school. On appeal, the Illinois
Supreme Court affirmed. 6 The United States Supreme Court reversed.
The Court said the first amendment right to free speech is not
an absolute right. Rather, it is hedged with qualifications for the
good of society. Defamatory speech is not protected because it is con-
sidered better for society to prevent its members' reputations from be-
ing smeared needlessly, than for individuals to have an unchecked right
to free speech. It is the role of the Supreme Court to weigh the inter-
ests of the individual in having unfettered rights against the interest
of the State in placing a restriction upon the right, such as punishing
the speaker to inhibit such socially dangerous speech.
In the instant case, the Supreme Court was faced with an individ-
ual who was punished for writing a false critical letter. The Court
weighed the interests of the teacher, balancing them against the school
district; to arrive at a decision based upon the opposing deciderata
it discerned.
First, the Court considered the claim of the school board that
Pickering's letter contained false statements and as such wasn't
"speech" protected by the first amendment. Pickering, on the other
4. 391 U.S. at 570.
5. The Illinois School Code of 1961 provides that school boards have the power
"to dismiss a teacher . . . whenever, in its opinion, the interests of the schools re-
quire it . . ." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 122, § 10-22-4 (1963). This provision is still in
effect.
6. 36 Il1. 2d 568, 225 N.E.2d 1 (1967).
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hand, claimed protection under the New York Times v. Sullivan7 rule
that statements about public figuress are protected speech unless made
"with knowledge of their falsity, or with reckless disregard for their
truth or falsity." After an independent examination of the record,
the Court found that Pickering's statements contained in the letter were
substantially correct, containing only minor errors committed without
malice or knowledge of their falsity.
Therefore, the Court noted that if Mr. Pickering were a member
of the general public, his letter would be protected. It was further
determined that the "fact of employment is only tangentially and insub-
stantially involved in the subject matter,"10 so Pickering should still
be considered to be a member of the general public. As such, his
speech is protected under the New York Times rule.
Secondly, the Court considered, in the words of Justice Marshall,
"a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in com-
menting upon matters of public concern and the interest of the State,
as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public services it
performs through its employees."'" Herein, the Court again applied
a balancing test. Applying as against the teacher's statements, criteria
such as harmony among co-workers, the need for confidentiality and
loyalty, and the efficient operation of the school on a day-to-day basis,
the Court could not discern any damage to the school district resulting
from Pickering's letter. Hence, applying our general proposition, the
teacher prevailed.
B. Procedure
In the cases of Board of Regents v. Roth12 and Perry v. Sinder-
mann,13 announced the same day, the Supreme Court ruled that non-
tenured teachers do not have a right to due process prior to being
"fired" by non-retention.
1. Board of Regents v. Roth
In 1968, David Roth was hired for one academic year by the
Wisconsin State University at Oshkosh to be an assistant professor of
7. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
8. See discussion of Gerty v. Robert Welch, Inc., infra, for an explanation of the
New York Times rule.
9. 391 U.S. at 573.
10. Id. at 574.
11. Id. at 568.
12. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
13. 408 U.S. 593 (1972).
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political science. While rated by the faculty as an excellent teacher,
Roth had publicly criticized the university administration for suspend-
ing a group of 94 black students without determining individual guilt.
Shortly thereafter, Roth was notified that he would not be rehired for
the next academic year. No reasons were given, nor was Roth given
an opportunity to challenge the decision at any sort of hearing.
Wisconsin statutory law1 4 provided that instructors in state univer-
sities shall be granted tenure after four years of teaching, and a tenured
teacher may be discharged only for cause upon written charges and
pursuant to certain procedures. According to the Rules of the Board
of Regents, a non-tenured teacher may have an opportunity for a re-
view of his case prior to dismissal during the school term. Roth, how-
ever, was not dismissed; rather, he was notified of his non-retention
for the coming year. Neither the State law nor the university rules
provided any procedure or standards for non-retained, non-tenured
teachers.
Roth brought suit in federal district court, alleging that his termi-
nation of future employment possibilities without a hearing violated
his (1) right to due process, and (2) right to freedom of speech.
The district court granted summary judgment on the procedural issue,
ordering the university to provide him with reasons and a hearing. 15
The Seventh Circuit affirmed.1"
The Supreme Court, however, noted that the right to due process
did not apply to Roth's case because he was not deprived of any liberty
or property within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment.
17
Liberty, in the context presented by Roth, is a two-fold concept.
First, it includes the right to have a good name protected against seri-
ous charges by the state. If the university made "any charge against
him that might seriously damage his standing and associations in his
community,"' 8 such as basing the nonrenewal on a charge of dishon-
esty or immorality, Roth would have been deprived of his liberty. The
other facet of liberty is the closely related right "to take advantage
of other employment opportunities."'19 The Court did not consider
14. Wis. Stat. § 37.31(1) (1967) (quoted in 408 U.S. at 566, n.2).
15. 310 F. Supp. 972 (W.D. Wis. 1970).
16. 446 F.2d 806 (7th Cir. 1971).
17. "(N)or shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, with-
out due process of law. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
18. "For where a person's good name, reputation, or integrity is at stake because
of what the government is doing to him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are
essential." 408 U.S. at 573.
19. Id. at 574.
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Roth's non-retention to be either an attack on his good name, or
such a "stigma or other disability"20 as to prevent future employment
as a teacher. Thus, it held that he was not deprived of his liberty.
21
A deprived property interest will also activate the due process re-
quirement of the fourteenth amendment. Herein, the Court noted
that a "property interest" must be something more than "an abstract
need" or a "unilateral expectation. ' 22  Rather, there should be a "legi-
timate claim of entitlement."23  In the instant case, Roth did not have
any such contractual right or other proprietary interest in teaching the
following year; but merely a legally insufficient unilateral expectation.
Justice Stewart, speaking for the Court, could find no deprivation
of liberty or property; therefore, the due process clause did not apply.
Hence-the "rule": a non-retained, non-tenured teacher need not be
afforded the notice and hearing requirements of due process.
2. Perry v. Sindermann
Robert Sindermann, like David Roth, found himself "non-re-
tained" for the coming academic year after a run-in with his university's
administration. Further, like David Roth, he was not afforded an op-
portunity to challenge the decision. The significant difference between
the two cases was that Sindermann had been teaching in the state col-
lege system for ten years, under successive one-year contracts, and the
university encouraged its instructors to "feel as if they were tenured"
after seven years, even though the system did not have a tenure pro-
gram. Initially, the Court looked for the deprivation of liberty or prop-
erty needed to trigger the fourteenth amendment under Roth. Al-
though he didn't have a formal property right in teaching the next
year, the Court found that Sindermann was deprived of property. He
was not merely suffering from the "unilateral expectation" of future
employment that plagued Roth. Rather, there was a "mutually explicit
understanding"24 of his future employment which qualifies as "prop-
erty" for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. Therefore, the
20. Id.
21. At 408 .U.S. 574 n.13, the Court explains its decision. There Was no proof in
the record to suggest how non-retention might affect Roth's future employment pros-
pects. This highly unrealistic holding drew sharp criticism from Justice Douglas: "Non-
renewal can be a blemish that turns into a permanent scar and effectively limits any
chance the teacher has of being rehired as a teacher, at least in his State." Id. at 585.
See 7 U. RICH. L. REV. 357, 360 n.19 (1972).
22. 408 U.S. at 577.
23. Id. at 577.
24. Id. at 601 quoting Roth.
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Court concluded, in such a case (i.e., with the "aroma" of tenure),
the fourteenth amendment applies, and the teacher should be afforded
the protection of due process-the opportunity for a fair hearing to
challenge the charges brought against him.
C. Current Seventh Circuit Cases
Having reviewed the leading Supreme Court cases, we now turn
to the Seventh Circuit's recent decisions.
1. Lipp v. Board of Education of City of Chicago"
David Lipp was employed by the Chicago Board of Education
as a full-time substitute teacher with temporary certification. At the
end of the school year, his principal filed an evaluation of his perform-
ance with the Board of Education that contained a satisfactory rating.
However, the evaluation further stated that he "has a negative attitude
towards the school as an institution," and that "he has an extreme
anti-establishment obsession." Lipp was not given a copy of his rating.
When Lipp learned of these unfavorable comments, he demanded
a hearing so he could confront the evaluator and challenge his state-
ments. Unfortunately for Mr. Lipp, the procedures established by the
Board of Education and the Chicago Teachers' Union for such chal-
lenging did not apply to temporarily certified teachers. Therefore, the
Board did not grant him an opportunity for a hearing on the removal
of the comments from his record.
Lipp filed a class action in the District Court for Northern District
of Illinois, asking for a declaration that the rating procedure violated
teachers' due process rights, an injunction against continued use of the
rating procedures, and the removal of the comment from his record.
The late Judge Alexander Napoli dismissed the complaint for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit straight-forwardly applied Roth
and Sindermann. The court indicated that since the plaintiff was not
deprived of liberty or property, there could not be any denial of due
process. Noting that liberty, as defined in Roth, is a two-pronged con-
cept: (1) the protection of a good name, reputation, honor, and integ-
rity, and (2) the freedom to take advantage of other employment op-
portunities, Senior Judge Castle28 opined that Lipp wasn't deprived
25. 470 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1972).
26. Chief Judge Swygert and Judge Pell agreed.
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of liberty because the report that he was "anti-establishment" standing
by itself was insufficient to be defamatory or otherwise destroy Lipp's
good name; as well as noting that he wasn't deprived of future employ-
ment because the Board of Education actually rehired him for the fol-
lowing year.
2. Donahue v. Staunton
-2 7
Father Joseph Donahue, a Roman Catholic Priest, was appointed
Catholic Chaplain at a state mental hospital 8 in 1966, serving the
spiritual needs of the hospital as well as making public relation
speeches explaining the hospital's operations.
In 1969, Father Donahue publicly criticized the hospital adminis-
tration for its failure to operate the institution properly. He cited ex-
amples of improprieties, such as neglect in preparing funerals for dead
patients, lack of efforts to prevent escapes, delays in medical care for
seriously ill patients, and acquiescence to patients' illicit sexual activi-
ties.
Although Father Donahue's similar public statements a few years
earlier led to a state investigation of the hopsital, this time the results
were different. He was fired. The administration claimed that Father
Donahue made his alarming statements without checking into the facts,
unduly exciting the hospital community; and that because of his stand,
it was in the best interests of the hospital to dismiss him.
Father Donahue brought suit in the Northern District of Illinois
against the hospital administrators, claiming that he was discharged
in abrogation of his right of free speech. At trial, Judge Austin found
for the plaintiff. Relying on Pickering, the Seventh Circuit affirmed.
In determining whether the hospital's interests in public efficiency
outweighed Father Donahue's right to free speech without reprisals,
the court began with Father Donahue's statements themselves and
found that even if they were false, they were "reasonably believed to
be true. . . and were not knowingly false and recklessly made."29
Next, the court analyzed and discussed the factors to be consid-
ered in the weighing process. The hospital argued that Father Dona-
.hue's statements impeded the proper performance of his daily duties,
and further, his statements were hard to counter because he was a
priest. The court flatly rejected these arguments.
27. 471 F.2d 475 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 93 S. Ct. 1419 (1973).
28. Manteno State Hospital, Illinois Department of Mental Health.
29. 471 F.2d at 479 (applying the New York Times rule).
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First of all, Father Donahue's job performance was not impeded.
Although his job included public relations duties which would ordi-
narily mean that the State's interest would prevail, since he couldn't
perform this job properly, this is not the case where free speech is
involved. Here, the court found that the Chaplain's public relations
duties weren't a substantial part of his job," as to give the State a
strong enough interest to interfere with the plaintiffs free speech
rights."3  To prevent what it felt would be an injustice, the court
looked to the essence to the Chaplain's duties, the religious and spirit-
ual counseling of the patients, and found that he had not breached
his duties to the hospital so as to lose his first amendment protection.
Acknowledging that Father Donahue's statements could have been
given greater credence by the general public because he was a priest,
the court noted that the hospital wasn't prevented in any way from
countering his statements; "in fact, at several points they specifically
chose not to respond."'" Clearly, the free debate contemplated by the
first amendment would have cleared up the issue. The court's con-
clusion as to the constitutional issue accurately portrays its philosophy:
"We conclude and hold in the case at bar that the interest of society
in the uninhibited and robust debate on matters of public concern such
as mental health care outweigh those of the State as an employer.
3 2
Chief Judge Swygert, however, dissented because he thought the
Chaplain's actions did substantially disrupt the hospital's operation.
Realizing that the "task of balancing the conflicting interests . . . is
admittedly a difficult one,' 33 he would nonetheless hold that the State
had a compelling and justified reason for terminating Father Donahue's
employment.
3. Hostrop v. Board of Junior College District No. 515
34
Richard Hostrop was employed as the President of Prairie State
Junior College in Chicago Heights, Illinois, under contracts which
ran until June, 1972. In 1970, he prepared a confidential memo on
a sensitive subject for circulation among his administrative staff for
discussion at a future staff meeting. An unknown person leaked the
contents of the memo to the public and some Board members promptly
questioned Hostrop's right to make such proposals. Shortly thereafter,
30. Id. at 481.
31. Id. at 475.
32. Id. at 481.
33. Id. at 486.
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the Board met and terminated his contract without giving him notice
of the charges against him, or any hearing or opportunity to speak
in his defense.
Dr. Hostrop filed suit in the District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois, claiming that his first amendment right to free speech
and fourteenth amendment right to due process were abrogated by the
Board's summary action. Judge Austin, who rendered judgment ear-
lier for Father Donahue, held that Dr. Hostrop's complaint did not
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The district court
applied the two-pronged Pickering analysis. The statement itself did
not pose a defamation-type problem to raise the New York Times ques-
tion; and in the balancing test, the Pickering Court suggested that em-
ployees in personal and intimate working relationships may be dis-
missed if they undermine the effectiveness of the relationship by pub-
licly criticizing the employer, even by the publication of true state-
ments. Judge Austin found that this statement from Pickering applied
perfectly to the relationship between the Board and Dr. Hostrop, and
that if the Supreme Court's comment was to have any application, it
was in this case.35
The Seventh Circuit 6 reversed. First of all, Dr. Hostrop was
working under a contract that would run for another two years. For
the State to deprive him of a contract right, which clearly qualifies
as property under the fourteenth amendment, it would have to conform
to the dictates of due process. Therefore, the court noted that Dr.
Hostrop must be given notice of the charges against him, notice of
the evidence upon which the charges will be based, a hearing before
an impartial tribunal, a chance to present witnesses and the opportunity
to confront adverse evidence at the hearing.
The court faced more of a problem when it considered the first
amendment claim. The Pickering rule, on one hand, seemed to dictate
that Dr. Hostrop did not have a right to free speech in this instance
because of his position; but on the other hand, the court clearly wanted
to prevent the erosion of individual rights such as the freedom of
speech. Therefore, in this regard, the court found that although Dr.
Hostrop's statement could be interpreted as a sign of disloyalty to the
Board, there was no proof that the statement actually caused a sub-
34. 471 F.2d 488 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 93 S. Ct. 2150 (1973).
35. 377 F. Supp. 977, 978 (N.D. 111. 1972), quoting from Pickering, 391 U.S.
at 570.
36. Opinion by Senior Judge Castle, Swygert, C.J., and Pell, J. concur.
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stantial or serious impairment to the relationship between Hostrop and
his employer such as would merit dismissal "merely for making the
suggestions. ' 7  Without the substantial impedence of the employer's
function by the employee's statements, the Pickering balancing test con-
cludes in favor of the employee. Furthermore, the court noted that
Dr. Hostrop's statement was a constructive statement much the same
as Mr. Pickering's letter, and to silence an exchange of ideas "in the
formulation of educational policy would certainly be contrary to the
spirit of the Pickering decision", 8 which protects the right to free
speech.
4. Clark v. Holmes"9
L. Verdelle Clark was employed by Northern Illinois University
as a non-tenured temporary substitute teacher beginning in the fall
semester of 1962, teaching an introductory health survey course in
the Department of Biological Sciences. In the spring, Clark was of-
fered a position for the next academic year but was warned about "cer-
tain deficiencies in his professional conduct",4 ° such as extensive per-
sonal counselling of students to the derogation of the University's coun-
selling service, over-emphasizing sex education in the health course,
and disparaging other staff members in discussions with students. In
discussions with his superiors, Clark said he would continue operating
in his style. He taught during the fall semester of 1963 but was noti-
fied that his temporary contract terminated at the end of the academic
year and he was not to teach any classes during the spring term.
Mr. Clark sought relief in the District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois. The complaint alleged that Clark was merely exer-
cising his first amendment right to freedom of speech, when the de-
fendants made false charges concerning his conduct to the University,
which then led to termination of his employment. Clark, in effect,
contended that he had a right to make such statements, and that he
was being penalized for making them. Also, at no time before termi-
nation was Clark afforded the due process right to defend himself
against the charges placed with the University. The trial court refused
to give an instruction on the first amendment rights of public school
teachers, contrary to the request of the plaintiff. He had sought
such an instruction so that the jury could find that his speech was
37. 471 F.2d at 492.
38. Id. at 493.
39. 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 93 S. Ct. 2148 (1973).
40. 474 F.2d at 930.
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protected. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants and the
plaintiff appealed, claiming as error the court's failure to give the first
amendment instruction to the jury.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court. The court noted
the balancing factors, and concluded that the analysis totally favored
the State. For example, the court noted that in Pickering, the teacher
was concerned about a matter of public concern-taxation-whereas
Mr. Clark, was involved "in disputes with his superiors and colleagues
about course content and counselling", which were not matters of pub-
lic concern, and involved him "as a teacher rather than as an interested
citizen."'
5. Illinois State Employees Union, Council 34 v. Lewis
42
Paul Powell, a Democrat, died while in office as Illinois Secretary
of State. Richard Ogilvie, the Republican Governor of Illinois, ap-
pointed Republican John W. Lewis to fill the unexpired term. Upon
accepting the position, Lewis terminated the services of many Demo-
crats employed in the Secretary of State's office. Lewis said he did
so to preserve the efficiency of his office, but the plaintiffs in this case,
some of the fired employees, claim that their dismissals were motivated
solely by political considerations. Furthermore, some plaintiffs allege
that they were told they could keep their jobs if they would change
over to the Republican Party. The employees filed suit in the District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois claiming that their discharges
violated their rights under the first and fourteenth amendments, and
sought reinstatement with back pay. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, and the plaintiffs appealed.
Although political patronage has been the rule in this nation
for at least a century and a half,43 the Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit accepted the challenge to put political favoritism in its proper
subordinate position to the first amendment right to free association.
The decision was structured similarly to those in the prior cases,
e.g., it looked first to identify the first amendment claim of the em-
ployee and then to the interests of the state which seek to counter-
balance the right. In addition, the court considered arguments of justi-
ciability and the legislative-judicial question.
41. 474 F.2d at 931. Per Curiam, Swygert, C.J., Pell, J., and Stevens, J.
42. 473 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. den., 93 S. Ct. 1364 (1973).
43. 473 F.2d at 568 n.14.
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A basic principle of constitutional law is that the government may
not punish an individual for exercising his constitutional rights. In
Pickering, for example, the Supreme Court held that "a teacher's exer-
cise of his right to speak on issues of public importance may not furnish
the basis for his dismissal from public employment ' 44 because to do
so would be to punish and inhibit free speech.
In the instant case, the exercise of the first amendment right to
associate in political activities was under attack by the state's cocercive
tactics which caused the plaintiffs to be discharged. Consequently,
the court held that "such interference with constitutional rights is im-
permissable" 5 and moved on to the question of balance.
It is certain that the State may prohibit certain individual conduct
if there is a strong enough state interest. In Cafeteria and Restaurant
Workers Union, Local 473, AFL-CIO v. McElroy,46 the Supreme
Court held that a civilian cook could be summarily excluded from a
naval gun factory on the grounds that the security needs of the in-
stallation outweighed the interest of the cook in working there. In
Pickering and its progeny, the interests of the State in good order were
weighed against the rights of the teacher to comment on matters of pub-
lic concern, and the teacher prevailed in the appropriate circumstances
as noted earlier. In this case, Judge Stevens' opinion for the court
held that although a state interest may involve some curtailment of
first amendment rights if justified, in this case the State was asking
for the "abject surrender" 47 of the plaintiffs' rights without proving
why it would be necessary to do so. Without such justification, the
individual rights prevail. The opinion raised an issue as to whether
the effective operation of the government through its executives de-
mands that broad discretion be vested in those who hire and fire. Re-
alizing that, because of the Constitution, the government doesn't have
the complete freedom of action enjoyed by a private employer, the
opinion forcefully stated: "The price which a government must pay
to protect the constitutional liberties of its employees is some loss of
the efficiency enjoyed by private employers; the Supreme Court has
repeatedly decided that the value of those individual liberties is well
worth the cost."
'48
44. 391 U.S. at 574.
45. 473 F.2d at 571.
46. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
47. 473 F.2d at 572.
48. Id. at 575.
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In addition to the balancing approach arguments, the State pro-
posed a number of other arguments in its behalf:
1. This controversy is a non-justiciable political question that does
not merit the federal government meddling in the affairs of a state.
The court flatly rejected this argument because it implies that a state
may routinely discriminate against members of a particular race or re-
ligion in addition to political membership in its employment policies.
All three types of discrimination are constitutionally interdicted, and
besides, the political question doctrine does not protect the government
from civil suits for damage caused by so-called political action.49
2. Federal judges may not impose a civil service system upon a state
government or otherwise interfere with its employment because such
a right would saddle governments with universal employment of its
citizenry. Rather, public employment is correctly categorized as a priv-
ilege, revocable at the convenience of the grantor. In recent years, how-
ever, the Supreme Court has ruled that even benefits may not be with-
drawn to the derogation of protected rights, 0 so in this case, the state
may not discharge its employees for the exercise of their rights to asso-
ciation. 1 The judicial review of this problem does not establish civil
service, pre-empting legislative rights; rather, it only preserves individ-
ual rights under the first amendment.
3. The spoils system is so firmly established that it may not be re-
moved by judicial fiat. In a footnote, the court rejected this argument
by stating that "if the age of a pernicious practice were a sufficient
reason for its continued acceptance, the constitutional attack on racial
discrimination would, of course, have been doomed to failure."
52
4. Those who live by the political sword must be prepared to die
by the political sword; this idea is known as the waiver theory. The
court rejected the waiver defense on the grounds that a waiver of con-
stitutional rights will not be lightly assumed and there is no evidence
of waiver in the record.
5. Political affiliation, Judge Stevens proposed, may be a relevant and
proper qualification for certain positions. This argument may have
49. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
50. See Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S.
254 (1970).
51. This argument was presented in two contexts. First to argue that the courts
shouldn't hear the case, and second to argue that the state was justified in discharging
the employees.
52. 473 F.2d at 568 n.14.
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validity when applied to the selection of policy making officials where
loyalty and shared ideas are essential to the operation of the govern-
ment, but has no application when discussing such ministerial positions
as janitor, elevator operator, teacher, or driver's license examiner.
The plaintiffs' due process arguments were handled by Judge
Stevens in a long footnote. Property deprivation under Roth did not
occur here because the plaintiffs did not have an expectation of retain-
ing their jobs, nor was there a deprivation of liberty because nobody's
reputation was smeared. This smacks of the waiver defense, but it is
to be remembered that the waiver of constitutional rights must be
shown to have been conscious, willing, and made upon a full knowl-
edge of the facts. Although the plaintiffs may have had a strong no-
tion concerning future employment after their party left office, the
opinion implies that the notion did not rise to the level of a wiaver.
The opinion ended by saying that "while the patronage system
is defended in the name of democratic tradition, its paternalistic im-
pact on the political process is actually at war with the deeper traditions
of democracy embodied in the first amendment."53
The significance of Lewis is that the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit has stepped into the cloudy and tradition-ridden area
of the patronage spoils system" to establish the rights of ministerial
public employees to job security and the freedom of political expres-
sion. Other jurisdictions have held differently, maintaining the patron-
age system until the legislatures decide to extend the civil service laws
to cover all public employees. For example, Alomar v. Dwyer,55 from
the Second Circuit and American Federation of State, County and Mu-
nicipal Employees, AFL-CIO v. Shapp,56 from the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania, decided to preserve the sytem, and drew a glowing re-
spect from Circuit Judge Kiley in his Lewis dissent, as well as more
than a casual note from District Judge Campbell in his concurrence.
There is a decisive split in the law which may not be settled by the
United States Supreme Court for quite some time, if at all.
We are witnessing what may be the rebirth of American politics
on the national level. The upper crust administrators come and go
in this time of change, yet the day-to-day business of the federal gov-
53. Id. at 576.
54. For a complete analysis of the field, see Note, A Constitutional Analysis of
the Spoils System-The ludiciary Visits the Patronage Palace, 57 IowA L. REv. 1320
(1972).
55. 447 F.2d 482 (2nd Cir. 1971), cert. den., 404 U.S. 1020 (1972).
56. 443 Pa. 527, 280 A.2d 375 (1971).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ernment continues without interruption because the Civil Service
Commission has insulated most employees from the pressures of poli-
tics, as has the Hatch Act. Yet on the state level, the patronage system
continues without respite and the real losers are the members of the
public for whose benefit the whole show is in operation. As a general
rule, patronage workers remain in office under the auspices of their
party, insulated from the pressures of efficient operation because as
long as they are good party members, their jobs are secure. The rule
should be inverted to allow and perhaps encourage the discharge of
incompetent politicos.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit's decision was
couched in the legalistic terms of the first amendment, quick to dismiss
the contrary arguments. To some, this may signify a predeliction
merely to justify its holding against patronage, but upon examination
of the other cases in the area of public employees, it seems that the
first amendment reasoning and concern is a genuine expression of lib-
eral constitutionality directed toward the preservation of individual
rights. A court that does not care about first amendment rights, decid-
ing Lewis only on the patronage issue, would not have used the lan-
guage of the Seventh Circuit in Donahue, Hostrop, or Lewis, praising
the protected rights of public employees as American citizens. There
is no doubt that the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals is on the frontiers
of constitutional law, blazing a new trail of freedom through the thick-
ets of restricting tradition.
II. Freedom of Speech Continued-Recent
Developments Involving Defamation
Gertd v. Robert Welch, Inc.1
7
Patrolman Nuccio of the Chicago Police Department was tried
and convicted for the murder of a 17-year old boy named Nelson.
Elmer Gertz, an eminent Chicago lawyer, was retained by the Nelson
family to press a civil claim for damages against Nuccio. A short
while later, the John Birch Society's American Opinion magazine pub-
lished an article concerning the trial that attempted to portray the entire
affair as part of a national conspiracy to discredit the police and lay
the groundwork for a totalitarian national police force. In the article,
Elmer Gertz was called a "communist-fronter", "Leninist," and a par-
ticipant in various "Marxist" and "Red" activities. Also, he was pur-
ported to be part of the conspiracy.
57. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. granted, 93 S. Ct. 1355 (1973).
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Gertz filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois for libel against the publishers of the article. The jury re-
turned a verdict of $50,000 for the plaintiff, but Judge Decker entered
judgment for defendant notwithstanding the verdict, concluding that
even if Gertz was a public figure, the subject matter of the article
was of public interest, and that the evidence presented at trial was
insufficient to support a finding of actual malice or a reckless disre-
gard for the truth. Gertz appealed.
As mentioned earlier, the rule derived from New York Times
v. Sullivan,58 is that even a statement that is libelous per se will be
protected speech under the first amendment if (1) made about a public
figure, and (2) made without either knowledge of its falsity or made
with reckless disregard for the truth. The primary issue in the instant
case was whether or not Elmer Gertz was a public figure. If so, the
article was protected by the first amendment; if not, an action for
libel could be maintained. A secondary issue was whether or not suffi-
cient evidence was introduced to prove either knowledge of falsity or
reckless disregard for the truth. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed the district court's judgment, finding for the defendant on
both of the above noted issues.
New York Times itself referred only to a public official in his
official conduct. Its progeny have expanded the concept of "public
official" to include "public figures." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts59
dealt with a statement in the Saturday Evening Post accusing Butts,
the athletic director of the University of Georgia, of conspiring to fix
a football game. The companion case, Associated Press v. Walker,
involved the false report from the Associated Press that General Walker
(Ret.) had led rioters at the University of Mississippi disturbances
when a black man, James Meredith, came on campus as a student. Al-
though both Butts and Walker were not public officials, the Supreme
Court decided that each was a public figure, who had thrust his "per-
sonality into the vortex of an important public controversy."' 0 Fur-
thermore, each "commanded sufficient continuing public interest and
had sufficient access to the means of counterargument to be able to
expose through discussion the falsehood and fallacies of the defamatory
statements."'" Such a position is tantamount to being a public official,
so the statements were held to be protected by the first amendment.
58. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
59. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
60. Id. at 155.
61. Id.
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Further, Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.6 2 involved a statement
concerning the publisher of allegedly obscene materials. A claim
of defamation arose. Therein, the Court reasoned that since the pub-
lisher involved himself in obscenity matters, and since obscenity is a
public issue deserving of robust public debate under the first amend-
ment, the involvement of a "private person" in obscenity does not re-
move the discussion from constitutional protection. Therefore, a "pri-
vate person" involved in matters of such public concern becomes a
"public figure" for purposes of the New York Times rule.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized that El-
mer Gertz is a well-known lawyer, author, lecturer, and "participant
in matters of public import," and therefore probably is a "public fig-
ure." But assuming, arguendo, that he is a "private person," his in-
volvement in the trial of a Chicago police officer, or the alleged nation-
wide conspiracy described in the articles were matters of such signifi-
cant public concern that Gertz became a public figure through his in-
volvement in public matters.
Secondarily, the court also held that there was insufficient evi-
dence concerning the deliberateness or recklessness of the falsehood
to remove the New York Times protection. In this regard, of consider-
able interest is the court's refusal to take judicial notice of matters
not in evidence concerning the pattern of reckless name-calling on the
part of the John Birch Society. The court noted that although a judge
may have a "sympathetic reaction" to the individual involved, the court
cannot "apply a fundamental protection in one fashion to the New
York Times and Time Magazine and in another way to the John Birch
Society. Whether we are moved to applaud or despise what is said,
our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same."63
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on February
20, 197364 and oral arguments should be in the late fall of 1973. A
decision is expected in the Spring of 1974.
Although not of great future significance, another recent Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit case of some interest is Wheeler
v. Glass,65 which involved an action, by two mentally retarded youths
62. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
63. 471 F.2d at 805.
64. 93 S. Ct. 1355 (1973).
65. 473 F.2d 983 (7th Cir. 1973).
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institutionalized in a state mental hospital,6 6 against the administrators
of the institution. The boys claimed that the defendants summarily
bound them to their beds in spread-eagle fashion for 77 hours
after an alleged consensual homosexual act between the boys. Further-
more, they allege that they were forced to scrub walls for more than
ten consecutive hours while dressed only in backless hospital gowns.
The plaintiffs claimed that these actions by the defendants violated
their rights to due process of law under the fourtheenth amendment,
and their rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment under
the eighth amendment.
The plaintiffs, therefore, sought a declaratory judgment and an
injunction against such future acts, as well as money damages. The
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed the com-
plaint, noting that even if the acts complained of may have been exces-
sive, they did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment; nor was
there a violation of due process because "being in the custody of vari-
ous state departments charged with the treatment of youthful offenders
does not entitle one to the full procedural safeguards of a criminal
defendant.
'6 7
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit6" reversed, holding
that the punishment was cruel and unusual, and the acts complained
of violated the due process rights of the plaintiffs. In discussing the
boundaries of the eighth amendment, Circuit Judge Sprecher avoided
a furthering of the dispute as to what rights a felon in a penetentiary
has, concluding that in this case, the treatment of two mentally re-
tarded boys was neither usual, in reference to usages in other places,
or "consistent with public opinion regarding evolving standards of de-
cency in a human society."69  Being cruel and unusual punishment,
such acts violated the eighth amendment. Next, addressing himself
to the due process issue, Judge Sprecher wrote that the officials en-
trusted with the care and training of youths must have "latitude in
disciplining their charges,' 7° but not as much latitude as evidenced
by this case, which alleges that there was no hearing whatsoever. Such
a situation is "constitutionally impermissible, '" 71 and violated the plain-
tiffs' rights to due process.
66. Elgin State Hospital.
67. Quoted in the court's opinion, 473 F.2d at 984.
68. Circuit Judges Stevens and Sprecher, and District Judge Gordon.
69. 473 F.2d at 983.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 987.
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III. Obscenity-Herein, "Dirty Movies at Drive-ins"
Cinecom Theaters Midwest States Inc. v. City of Fort Wayne72
The plaintiffs, owners of two drive-in motion picture theaters in
Fort Wayne, Indiana, challenged the constitutionality of a local ob-
scenity ordinance. The statute makes it unlawful to exhibit certain
types of material in drive-in movie theaters if the material can be seen
from any public street or highway. The proscribed material included
any exhibit in which "bare buttocks or the bare female breasts of the
human body are shown.""3  The District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Indiana upheld the constitutionality of the abovementioned
ordinance, 74 and the plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit reversed, holding the ordinance to be unconstitu-
tional because of its overbreadth.
The concept of "variable obscenity" is simply a recognition that
some matter may be obscene to one person (e.g., a child) or in one
context (e.g., pandering), whereas, that same matter would not be ob-
scene to another person (e.g., an adult) or in another context (e.g.,
clinically). Because a drive-in movie is a unique form of communica-
tion, i.e., people outside the confines of the theater can view the presen-
tation, the Supreme Court has indicated that a community may take
this unique aspect into consideration in protecting its children from
viewing matters obscene to them.
75
In application of these concepts to the instant case however, the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit indicated that such rights
to restrict are not absolute. Herein, the court noted that if the ma-
terial involved would be obscene to everyone, then it may be totally
proscribed. On the other hand, if only under variable obscenity, it
would be obscene only to young children, it may be restricted, but
such restrictions must consider the rights of older children and/or
adults to view the material. In the instant case, the ordinance was
worded so that in some instances, it prevented the showing of material
that all had a right to view; and in other instances, it prevented the
viewing of material by some who had a right to see it. Thus, being
too broadly worded, the court held the ordinance to be unconstitu-
tional. 70
72. 473 F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1973).
73. Id. at 1299.
74. Portions of the ordinance prohibiting "strip-tease, burlesque, or nudist-type
scenes" in movies were struck down by the district court as being impermissibly vague.
75. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
76. The court cited Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 366 F.2d 590 (5th
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The court also rejected the defendant City's contention that the
exhibition of the matter on the outdoor screen amounted to an "assault
upon individual privacy."" This argument was rejected because,
"passing motorists were able to see the screen for only a short moment.
The disruption of traffic, or traffic accidents were simply not probable.
Nor was there any evidence that the visual presentations were so obnox-
ious to those walking in the area so as to preclude their avoidance
simply by averting their eyes.
'
"78
Thus, unlike the U.S. Supreme Court's recent attitude of "protect-
ing society" against harmful or obscene material, the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit continues to "protect the individual" in his exer-
cise of free speech.79  Only time will tell which interest is more in
need of protection.
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A very exciting constitutional dispute has arisen in the area of
secured transactions. Quite a few courts, including two district courts
within the Seventh Circuit, have dealt with the practice of repossession
or closely related problems. The following discussion shall provide
a detailed overview of the topic so that the local cases can be under-
stood in both a national and constitutional context.
Repossession by self-help is a time-honored practice by which
a creditor can assure himself of the security of his outstanding loan
to a debtor. At the time of the loan, the creditor asks for, and receives
from the debtor, a security interest in an item of collateral so that
if the debtor defaults in repaying the loan the creditor may utilize this
second remedy and sell the collateral securing the debt. Repossession
is the means by which the secured creditor himself (without judicial
assistance), takes possession of the collateral in order to sell it.
Uniform Commercial Code § 9-50381 provides the legal require-
ments for repossession. It allows the secured party to help himself
Cir. 1966), for the proposition that "a child's freedom of speech is too important to be
overridden by an ordinance expressing the community's view of what it considers as
material harmful to its youth." 473 F.2d at 1302.
77. 473 F.2d at 1302 (quoting Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767 (1967)).
78. 473 F.2d at 1303.
79. Miller v. California, 93 S. Ct. 2607 (1973); Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton,
93 S. Ct. 2628 (1973); U.S. v. 12 200 ft. Reels of Super 8 mm. Film, 93 S. Ct. 2665
(1973); United States v. Orito, 93 S. Ct. 2674 (1973); Kaplan v. California, 93 S.
Ct. 2680 (1973).
80. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-503 states:
"Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take pos-
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to the collateral if two conditions are met. First, the debtor must be
in default on the loan, and second, the actual taking of the collateral
must not cause a breach of the peace. A constitutional question arises
because it is claimed that such a taking of property without the niceties
of due process, i.e., hearing notice, etc., constitutes a violation of the
fourteenth amentment. 8s
In the preceding section on public employees, it was noted that
an individual must show a deprivation of either "property" or "liberty"
by the state to meet the threshhold requirement necessary to activate
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 82 Similarly, the
disputes over the constitutionality of repossession, the decisions utilize
the same concept of the threshhold analysis to trigger the due process
clause, using these and other conditions precedent for application of
the fourteenth amendment. Since repossession involves a creditor de-
priving an individual of his property without a hearing, the relevant
concepts for an individual seeking the protection of due process are
"deprivation", "property", and "state action".
In the past few years, the Supreme Court jumped into the field
of debtor-creditor relationships in determining whether creditors must
afford debtors the rights of due process before taking away their prop-
erty. The major cases which have seen this recent Supreme Court
activity are Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bayview,83 striking
down pre-judgment wage garnishments, and Fuentes v. Shevin,84 which
declared indiscriminate prejudgment replevin procedures to be uncon-
stitutional.
1. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp. of Bayview8 5
Mrs. Sniadach allegedly owed $420 on a promissory note to Fam-
ily Finance, and to collect the debt Family Finance instituted a garnish-
ment action. Under Wisconsin law, Sniadach's employer was required
session of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed
without judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may
proceed by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party
may require the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to
the secured party at a place to be designated by the secured party which is
reasonably convenient to both parties. Without removal a secured party
may render equipment unusable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's
premises under Section 9-504."
81. Portions of the following text have appeared in Spak, The Constitutionality of
Repossession by Secured Creditors Under Article 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 10 HOUST. L. REV. 855 (1973).
82. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
83. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
84. 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
85. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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to withhold one-half of her wages pending a court determination of
the case.86 Mrs. Sniadach attacked this prejudgment garnishment pro-
vision as violative of the due process requirement of the fourteenth
amendment. The Supreme Court of Wisconsin rejected Mrs. Snia-
dach's contention, 7 but the United States Supreme Court reversed, find-
ing the Wisconsin scheme unconstitutional. In analyzing Sniadach
in terms of the fourteenth amendment's prohibition of state deprivation
of "life, liberty, or property, without due process of law," three issues
can be discerned: (1) Is there an action of the state? (2) Is there
a deprivation of property? and (3) Is due process satisfied?
First, the requirement of "state action" is met when the action
has as its source a person or an agency formally identifiable as a state
instrumentality, regardless of the position of the particular officer or
agency in the governmental hierarchy. 8  Sniadach, the prejudgment
garnishment statute was enforceable only through the action of the state
court, so it must be said that state action was present.
Second, prior to Sniadach, it was commonly accepted that "depri-
vation of property" went to the title of the property. If a property
owner had been permanently deprived of the use of his property because
his title was seized, there was a deprivation. In the prejudgment gar-
nishment proceedings, the wages were only temporarily frozen, and
if the garnishee prevailed at trial, all of the wages would be returned.
It was reasoned that such a deprivation of property was only temporary
and that a true deprivation had not occurred.
Sniadach upset the traditional deprivation arguments by holding
that even a temporary freezing of wages was a deprivation under the
fourteenth amendment.8 9 Rather than holding outright that any tem-
porary deprivation of property by a state is forbidden, the decision
adhered to the traditional meaning of deprivation, but carved an excep-
tion for wages. The Court characterized wages as "a specialized type
of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system",90
so that even the temporary deprivation of wages under the prejudgment
86. Wis. Laws, Ch. 507, § 267.18(2)(a), .07(1) (1965). A portion of this en-
actment is presently in effect. Wis. Stat. § 267.07(1) (Supp. 1972). The Wisconsin
law allowed a plaintiff creditor seeking a prejudgment garnishment against a debtor to
serve a summons and complaint on the debtor within ten days after service on the per-
son holding debtor's wages. Therefore, prejudgment garnishments could be obtained
without notice to the debtor and without a hearing. Wis. Stat. § 267.01(1) (Supp.
1972).
87. Family Fin. Corp. v. Sniadach, 37 Wis. 2d 163, 154 N.W.2d 259, 265 (1967).
88. See Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883).
89. 395 U.S. at 339.
90. Id. at 340.
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wage garnishment statute was deemed to constitute a deprivation of
property contrary to the fourteenth amendment.9'
Third, the general rule of due process is that a person must be
given notice that will apprise him of the pendency of an action and
afford an opportunity for hearing to present objections before he may
be deprived of life, liberty, or property. 92 The concept of procedural
due process is rooted in the spirit of fundamental fairness to the indi-
vidual subject only to the needs of society in extraordinary situations
requiring deference to the state.
93
Mr. Justice Douglas, writing for the Sniadach Court, acknowl-
edged the need for summary procedures in some unusual instances,
but noted that the facts in Sniadach did not present a situation requir-
ing special protection to either the state or the creditor; in addition,
the Wisconsin statute was not narrow enough to meet any such unusual
condition. 4 Finally, in personam jurisdiction was possible in Sniadach
because the debtor was a resident of the state and was amenable to
personal service. Thus, since none of the exceptions to the due process
rule applied, the Court held that the debtor must be afforded notice
and an opportunity for a hearing before her wages could be seized.
Sniadach was followed by Goldberg v. Kelly,95 a case that rested
upon the premise that welfare payments were a specialized type of
property, closely akin to wages, requiring due process to be met before
deprivation. 6 Subsequently, the lower courts were faced with the
problem of interpreting Sniadach and Goldberg. Some courts con-
strued Sniadach and Goldberg as being confined to their own facts
and upheld other summary prejudgment remedies that involved types
of property other than wages.97  Other courts, however, construed Sni-
91. Id. at 341-42.
92. E.g., Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 211 (1962).
93. In some extraordinary situations of the United States Supreme Court found
the due process requirements of notice and a hearing before seizure less important than
the isolation or seizure of property in the face of an overwhelming public interest.
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casseberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 601-02 (1950) (allowed summary
seizure of misbranded items or those dangerous to health); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332
U.S. 245, 256-57 (1947) (permitted the seizure of a bank's assets during an investiga-
tion).
94. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 339 (1969).
95. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
96. Id. at 264, 267-68.
97. Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn. 1971);
Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308, 1312-13 (D.D.C. 1970); Reeves v. Motor Con-
tract Co., 324 F. Supp. 1011, 1016 (N.D. Ga. 1971); American Olean Tile Co. v.
Zimmerman, 317 F. Supp. 150, 151-52 (D. Hawaii 1970); Tennplan, Inc. v. Superior
Ct., 105 Ariz. 270, 463 P.2d 68, 70 (1969); 300 W. 154th St. Realty Co. v. Department
of Bldgs., 26 N.Y.2d 538, 311 N.Y.S.2d 899, 902-03, 260 N.E.2d 534, 536-37 (1970).
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adach and Goldberg broadly, striking down all summary prejudgment
remedies except in extraordinary circumstances.9 8 The Supreme Court
was afforded the opportunity to choose between the narrow and broad
interpretations when it considered Fuentes v. Faircloth,99 which in-
volved a narrow interpretation of Sniadach.
2. Fuentes v. Shevin'00
At the same time Mrs. Sniadach learned of the action pending
against her, she also discovered that her wages were frozen. So it
was with Margarita Fuentes, a resident of Florida, who learned of an
action against her when a deputy sheriff arrived at her home to seize
her stove and stereo. She had purchased the stereo and stove under
a conditional sales contract from a local retailer, and according to the
contract, she was entitled to possession until she defaulted on the
monthly payments. Mrs. Fuentes claimed that the stove did not work,
but the retailer disregarded her complaint about the stove. She then
stopped paying on the stove, but payed off the balance due on the
stereo. The retailer, however, treated the stereo pay off as if it were
a prepayment on the entire contract. The retailer claimed that she
defaulted, initiated a suit, posted a bond equal to twice the value of
the goods, and submitted to the court clerk a form asking for a writ
of replevin. The writ was summarily issued, and later that day the
goods were seized. Had there been a hearing before the seizure, Mrs.
Fuentes could have prevented the taking of the stereo by explaining
the situation to a court, which could have found her to be rightfully
in possession of the stereo.
The facts of Fuentes demonstrate the state action required for
application of the fourteenth amendment. The sheriffs seizure of
property in the possession of a person upon the application of another
was clearly the act of an agent of the state under color of state law.
98. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 622 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev. sub nom.
Adams v. Southern California First National Bank, CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE
51,773 (9th Cir., Oct. 4, 1973), see discussion in text, infra; Collins v. Viceroy
Hotel Corp., 338 F. Supp. 390, 396-98 (N.D. Ill. 1972), see discussion in text, infra;
Klim v. Jones, 315 F. Supp. 109, 124 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Laprease v. Raymours Furni-
ture Co., 315 F. Supp. 716, 722-24 (N.D.N.Y. 1970); Santiago v. McElroy, 319 F.
Supp. 284, 292-94 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Radone v. Superior Ct., 5 Cal. 3d 536, 488 P.2d
13, 32, 96 Cal. Rptr. 709, 728 (1971); Blair v. Pitchess, 5 Cal. 3d 258, 486 P.2d 1242,
1257-58, 96 Cal. Rptr. 42, 57-58 (1971); Jones Press, Inc. v. Motor Travel Services,
Inc., 286 Minn. 205, 176 N.W.2d 87, 90-91 (1970); Larson v. Fetherston, 44 Wis. 2d
712, 172 N.W.2d 20, 23 (1969).
99. 317 F. Supp. 954, 958 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom. Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
100. 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
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As to "deprivation of property," the Court in Sniadach had not consid-
ered whether the deprivation there was permanent or temporary or the
effect, if any, of the distinction. The Fuentes Court attacked the
problem methodically, discussing types of ownership, types of property,
and duration of deprivation. First, it expanded the concept of property
ownership from earned wages in Sniadach to include those properties
in which the debtor has less than full title. Mrs. Fuentes was the
purchaser of goods under a conditional sales contract in which the
title rested with the vendor until the last installment of the purchase
price was paid. Under traditional property notions, her interest might
not have been protected as "property" under the fourteenth amend-
ment. The Court in Fuentes, however, expressly held that the depriva-
tion of even a possessory interest was within the protection of the four-
teenth amendment because it was "a significant property interest."' 1
Sniadach apparently carved out an exception from the traditional
rule to allow the fourteenth amendment to apply to "a specialized type
of property"'1 2 under the theory that wages were essentials of life. 03
Similarly, in Goldberg the Court reasoned that welfare payments re-
quired due process before deprivation.' 04 Nevertheless, some courts
held to the "necessity of life test" and refused to require due process
for nonessential items. 10 5 Fuentes, according to the district court, was
such a case because the stereo set was not a necessity of life. 106 The
Supreme Court in Fuentes disregarded the necessities of life test and
stated that the fourteenth amendment speaks of "property" in general;
whatever the property acquired, it is subject to the requirements of
due process prior to seizure.
Finally, Fuentes briefly considered the length of time necessary
for a deprivation. Coincident to the holding that the deprivation of
any significant property interest fell within the scope of the fourteenth
amendment, the Court held that the length of a deprivation was incon-
sequential:
The Fourteenth Amendment draws no bright lines around three-day,
101. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 & n.5 (1971).
102. 395 U.S. 337, 340 (1969).
103. Id. at 341-42. In Fuentes, prior Supreme Court decisions are cited to point
out that Sniadach did not carve out an exception (Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983,
1998 (1972)). Perhaps the answer to the confusion is that the Court is reinterpreting
and extending Sniadach to fit the facts of Fuentes.
104. 397 U.S. at 267-68.
105. E.g., Black Watch Farms, Inc. v. Dick, 323 F. Supp. 100, 102 (D. Conn.
1971); Young v. Ridley, 309 F. Supp. 1308, 1312-13 (D.D.C. 1970).
106. Fuentes v. Faircloth, 317 F. Supp. 954, 958 (S.D. Fla. 1970), rev'd sub nom.
Fuentes v. Shevin, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
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10-day, or 50-day deprivations of property. Any significant tak-
ing of property by the State is within the purview of the Due
Process Clause. While the length and consequent severity of a
deprivation may be another factor to weigh in determining the ap-
propriate form of hearing, it is not decisive of the basic right to a
prior hearing of some kind.10 7
In Sniadach the concept of due process was confined to balancing
the right of an individual to due process prior to a seizure against
the needs of society in certain extraordinary instances to provide due
process after the seizure. Fuentes refined the due process issue further
by breaking it down into the balancing analysis and the hearing analy-
sis.
Balancing the rights of individuals against the needs of society
did not give the Sniadach Court much difficulty, because no compelling
state interest was presented and the seizure was not necessary to secure
jurisdiction over the debtor. Fuentes repeated this analysis and con-
cluded that some extraordinary situations may require the summary
seizure of goods; since the replevin statutes under consideration were
indiscriminate and overly broad, however, they were unconstitutional.
The Court noted that "there may be cases in which a creditor could
make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy or
conceal disputed goods.' 0 8  Accordingly, it would be constitutional
to allow a state official to review such a situation before a lawful sei-
zure.
Procedural due process requires that parties whose rights are af-
fected are entitled to a hearing. To enjoy that right they must be
notified "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."109 The
replevin statutes at issue in Fuentes authorized a hearing after the sei-
zure, prompting the question of whether a hearing after seizure was
at a meaningful time so as to prevent an arbitrary deprivation of prop-
erty. Justice Stewart, writing for the majority in Fuentes, rejected the
validity of a post-seizure hearing, noting that the purpose of due proc-
ess was to prevent arbitrary takings, not to provide a remedy aftet
the fact:
If the right to notice and a hearing is to serve its full purpose,
then, it is clear that it must be granted at a time when the depri-
vation can still be prevented. At a later hearing, an individual's
possessions can be returned to him if if was (sic) unfairly or mis-
takenly taken in the first place. Damages may even be awarded
107. 92 S. Ct. at 1997.
108. Id. at 2000-01.
109. Id. at 1994.
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to him for the wrongful deprivation. But no later hearing and no
damage award can undo the fact that the arbitrary taking that
was subject to the right of procedural due process has already
occurred.110
The question of whether Mrs. Fuentes had waived her right to
due process also was raised. The seller contended that Mrs. Fuentes
waived her due process rights by signing an agreement that provided
"in the event of default of any payment or payments, Seller at its option
may take back the merchandise. . . ." The Court noted that the
terms were part of a printed form contract in small type, with little
explanation of their meanings. In addition the parties were unequal
in bargaining power. Weighing the above factors, the Court concluded
that there was no waiver.
Since the Fuentes Court found no waiver of due process, the due
process clause to the fourteenth amendment applied, and due process,
therefore, had to be afforded to the debtor before there would be a
valid prejudgment replevin of his property. The Court quoted from
Sniadach:
(D)ue process if afforded only by the kinds of 'notice' and 'hear-
ing' which are aimed at establishing the validity, or at least the
probable validity, or the underlying claim against the alleged
debtor before he can be deprived of his property. .... ill
The Fuentes dissent"' can be analyzed in terms of the balancing
approach to due process. Due process is a flexible concept, protecting
individual rights against the state wherever it is necessary or desirable
to do so. Mr. Justice White's dissent set forth the proposition that
the debtor was being protected enough to satisfy due process because
as a practical matter most prejudgment takings are justified. The dis-
sent concluded that it it was not worth the trouble to require creditors
to protect the rights of a few debtors against arbirary takings when
there was no permanent damage rendered. After all, Justice White
noted, "dollar and cent considerations weigh heavily against false
claims of default as well as against precipitate action that would allow
no opportunity for mistakes to surface and be corrected."' 13 Addition-
ally, the dissent argued that since the Permanent Editorial Board for
the Uniform Commercial Code had not recommended a change in re-
110. Id. at 1994-95.
111. Id. at 2002-03, (quoting Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 343
(1969) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
112. The dissenters were Chief Justice Burger, Justice White, and Justice Blackman,
92 S. Ct. at 2003.
113. Id. at 2004.
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gard to remedies upon default the Court should defer to those who
have struggled with the default problems throughout the years." 4
It should be pointed out that Mr. Justice Powell and Mr. Justice
Rehnquist did not participate in Fuentes. Had they participated, there
is no real doubt in the mind of this writer that they would have agreed
with the dissent, making the result a five-four decision in favor of re-
plevin rather than a four-three decision against it.
The Constitutionality of UCC Section 9-503
Following Sniadach, lower courts were faced with the problem
of interpreting its "specialized type of property" holding. Diverse
holdings among the circuit courts culminated in Fuentes, which, with
the specificity of its holding, ended all conjecture as to due process and
deprivations of property. Fuentes allowed a little latitude whenever
a court faced a similar case that involved a creditor's prejudgment sei-
zure of property. Nevertheless, cases challenging the validity of UCC
9-503, which allows summary repossession upon default by a secured
creditor without a breach of the peace, 1 5 have met with varying reac-
tions in the courts. The main issue in such cases has been whether
there is sufficient state action in the deprivation of a person's property
to invoke the fourteenth amendment, and the following is a brief sum-
mary of the arguments utilized in the cases.
State action in its most patent form involves direct action by
the state, such as a uniformed law officer's going to someone's house
and seizing property. In such a case, the state is acting directly because
the agent's actions do not have to be authorized. The fact that the
agent was being clothed with apparent authority suffices to involve
the state under the fourteenth amendment. Repossession, however, is
quite a different matter, because the secured party ordinarily acts by
himself, without the assistance of a state officer. Some courts dealing
with the problem have failed to find the direct or active state action
which triggers the due process clause, as opposed to the passive state
action which will not.
In Greene v. First National Exchange Bank,11 for example, the
court held that repossession was not a direct state action and concluded
that the fourteenth amendment guarantees did not apply.
114. Id. at 2006.
115. See note 72, supra.
116. 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
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The Fourteenth Amendment can control only the actions of
states, not private individuals. Therefore, because the operation
of the statute involved does not require the aid, assistance, or in-
teraction of any state agent, body, organization, or function, the
state has not deprived the plaintiff of his property." 17
Similarly, the Oregon Supreme Court failed to find such direct state
action in Brown v. United States National Bank of Oregon.'"
Indirect state action poses a much greater problem. Over the
years, state action, as applied under the equal protection clause, has
evolved in Supreme Court decisions to include an increasing number
of individually committed, racially discriminatory acts. Under the old
traditional concept, it was thought that state action was only present
where the state was directly involved. Today, however, state action
is held to exist if a private individual conspires with an agent of the
state,"1 a if the actions of an individual may be summarily enforced
by the state as if part of an overt conspiracy,120 or if the state clothes
an individual with the authority of state law by issuing a special police
officer's badge to a private investigator.' 2 '
The mere enactment of a statute has been regarded as state action
if it encourages, authorizes, or permits an individual to perform an
act that would be contrary to due process or equal protection but for
the state action. In Reitman v. Mulkey,'22 California voters amended
their constitution to overturn state laws that prohibited discrimination
in the sale of residential real estate. The Supreme Court of California
ruled that the amendment was unconstitutional, holding that rather
than merely repealing antidiscrimination laws, the amendment encour-
aged racial discrimination and as such constituted state action.1 23  The
United States Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the amendment
made the right to discriminate a basic state policy. Furthermore,
stated the Court, since the Supreme Court of California believed that
the amendment would significantly encourage and involve the state
in private discrimination, the amendment constituted state action.
There is a persuasive analogy between the Reitman case and the
case of an ordinary automobile repossession. In Reitman, a state con-
117. Id. at 675.
118. CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 11 52, 126, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 549 (Ore.
Sup. Ct., Apr. 19, 1973).
119. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966).
120. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970).
121. Williams v. United States, 341 U.S. 97 (1951).
122. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
123. 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 831-32, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881, 887 (1966).
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stitutional amendment was found to be state action because its effect
caused outright involvement of the state in the encouragement of dis-
crimination. Similarly, in a repossession case, the secured creditor re-
possesses the auto without due process under the authority of Section
9-503 of the UCC: In both cases, the state's enactment has encouraged
individuals to commit acts that they may have refrained from doing
in the absence of a statute authorizing their actions. It is reasonable
to believe that one would hesitate to break into another's car unless
he knew both that he had a statutory right to do so and that such
a right would shield him from arrest as a car thief.
That argument was presented in Adams v. Egley,1 24 the first case
to hold summary repossession by self-help to be unconstitutional. Re-
lying almost exclusively on the Reitman decision, District Court Judge
Leland Nielson of the Southern District of California ruled that the
California enactment of UCC Section 9-503 sets forth a state policy
condoning repossession and that security agreements merely embody
that policy. The statute, therefore, constituted a state action suffici-
ent to involve the fourteenth amendment. Since the taking was a state
action depriving an individual of his property without due process of
law, the California counterpart of UCC Section 9-503 was held uncon-
stitutional.
The Adams decision failed to meet with the approval of the other
California court that has faced the identical issue. Oiler v. Bank of
America,1'2 5 a case in the Northern District of California, declined to
find state action by distinguishing Reitman as a racial discrimination
case to which the fourteenth amendment and the Civil Right Acts
126
were designed to apply. Reasoning that repossession was not the type
of evil at which the fourteenth amendment had been directed, the court
found that the "historical, legal, and moral considerations" that were
paramount in extending federal jurisdiction to meet racial injustices
simply did not exist in Oller.
27
In addition to the racial discrimination argument, 28 courts have
124. 338 F. Supp. 614, 617 (S.D. Cal. 1972), rev. sub nom. Adams v. Southern
California First National Bank, CCH SECuRED TRANsACrIoNs GUIDE 51,773 (9th Cir.,
Oct. 4, 1973), see text infra. Adams was decided by the district court prior to
Fuentes on the basis of Sniadach.
125. 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
126. Id. at 23. Federal jurisdiction in Oller was based upon three federal statutes
enacted under the fourteenth amendment: 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,
1343(3) (1970).
127. 342 F. Supp. at 23.
128. Colvin v. Avco Financial Services of Ogden, Inc., CCH SECURED TRANSAC-
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distinguished Reitman in two other respects. First, Reitman repre-
sented a change in the existing law, and there had been no change
in the law of repossession. Secondly, Reitman involved an intentional
circumvention of the civil rights laws, whereas repossession was a
straightforward procedure not designed to maneuver around any other
law, past or present.
In addition to not finding direct state action or distinguishing
Reitman on its facts, courts have declined to find state action in repos-
session cases because repossession statutes merely codify the common
law, and the repossession arises from the contractual agreement be-
tween the parties.
In Messenger v. Sandy Motors, Inc., 2 9 the court first distin-
guished Reitman and then concluded that merely codifying a common
law practice dating back centuries did not take the action out of the
private area and make it state action subject to the fourteenth amend-
ment. The same conclusion was reached in four other cases dealing
with repossession, Greene v. First National Exchange Bank,1 0 North-
side Motors of Florida, Inc. v. Brinkely,13 ' Shelton v. General Electric
Credit Corp.,'132 and Giglio v. Bank of Delaware;133 these courts all
holding repossession constitutional for the reason that mere codification
of the common law does not constitute state action.
Yet, another court deciding a similar problem dealing with the
constitutionality of a distraint statute has decided otherwise. In Hall
v. Garson,13 1 the court was faced with the question of validity of the
Texas distraint statute, 3 ' which grants to the operator of any apartment
a lien upon certain personal property found within a tenant's dwelling
for all rents due and unpaid by the tenant. Furthermore the statute
grants to the operator the right to enforce such liens by preemptory
seizure and retention of the tenant's property until the rent due has
been paid. In addition, there is no provision for any kind of prior
hearing in the statute, although the tenant may replevy distrained goods
and bring an action in trespass for an improper seizure. The court
TIONS GUIDE 52,046, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 25 (D.C.N.D. Utah, Jan. 4, 1973); Kirksey
v. Theilig, 351 F. Supp. 727 (D. Colo. 1972).
129. 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402 (1972).
130. 348 F. Supp. 672 (W.D. Va. 1972).
131. CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,185 (Fla. Sup. Ct., July 31, 1973).
132. CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,213 (D.C.M.D. Ga. June 12,
1973).
133. CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,198 (Del. Ct. Chan., June 11,
1973).
134. 468 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1972).
135. Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. Ann. art. 5238a (Supp. 1972).
136. Ill. Rev. Stat., ch. 71, § 2, and ch. 82, § 57 (1969).
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held that since the distraint procedure authorized the landlord to use
the traditional power of the state to execute a lien, such a delegation
of power amounted to state action.
In the Seventh Circuit, a district court held the Illinois Innkeepers'
Lien Law 3 ' to be unconstitutional in Collins v. Viceroy Hotel Corp.
1 87
Parallel to the Texas distraint law, a hotel proprietor was granted a
lien upon the property brought into his hotel by a guest, as well as
the power to summarily enforce the lien by seizing the property and
selling it upon non-payment of charges by the guests, all without an
opportunity for the guest to contest the proprietor's claim. The late
Judge Alexander Napoli held that the state acted affirmatively by pass-
ing the statute, constituting the state action necessary to find that a
person has acted "under color of state law" to involve the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
These procedures are almost identical with repossession pro-
cedures under UCC Section 9-503. Distraint, innkeepers' lien laws,
and repossession by self-help existed at common law to provide for
a summary disposition of outstanding debts. All three allow an indi-
vidual to take the property in possession of another without a prior hear-
ing and all three allow the taker to be the judge of whether a seizure
should take place. In the event of an improper seizure, distraint and re-
possession allow for damages, and all three have been codified in state
statutes. The differences between them are that they deal with separate
and distinct legal relationships. Repossession may be seen to arise
from a contractual relationship, although the other two procedures
could be made contractual by including them in formal agreements,
such as leases or waivers to be signed by guests registering in hotels.
Since the three procedures are of the same nature, it is incongruous
for courts to decide the cases differently, summarily finding state action
in two but not in the third.
A final argument employed to avoid finding state action in repos-
session by self-help is that since the secured creditor's right to recover
the goods upon default arises from the security agreement, it cannot
be said that the state has acted in a private contract between individ-
uals.' 3 ' After all, if the contract recites the right to repossession upon
137. 338 F. Supp. 390 (N.D. 111. 1972).
138. Oiler v. Bank of America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972); McCormick v.
First Nat'l Bank, 322 F. Supp. 604, 606 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Messenger v. Sandy Motors,
Inc., 121 N.J. Super. 1, 295 A.2d 402, 405 (1972); Giglio v. Bank of Delaware,
CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,198, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 934 (Del. Ct.
Chancery, June 11, 1973); Brown v. United States National Bank of Oregon, CCH
SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE 52,126 (Ore. Sup. Ct., April 19, 1973).
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default without a breach of the peace, the state has not acted in the
matter at all.
A few lower courts besides the district court in Adams v. Egley
have overcome the state action problem of repossession under UCC
Section 9-503. In Michel v. Rex-Noreco Inc.,'3 9 Chief Judge Holden
of the Vermont Federal District Court granted a preliminary injunction
to halt the threatened repossession of a mobile home. He found state
action to be present under the Hill v. Garson rationale and proceeded
to demonstrate that repossession violates due process. 1 0 Of particular
note in the decision is the court's utilization of Fuentes arguments,
rather than merely echoing the holding. The court intimated that re-
possession would be allowed upon a showing of extraordinary circum-
stances or immediate danger to the collateral,' 4' but in the absence
of such a showing, an injunction would issue to prevent the unlawful
taking.'42 Also, it was held that the creditor had not waived her right
to due process by signing the security agreement which permitted re-
possession by self-help. As in Fuentes, the court referred to the sign-
ing of this fine printed agreement, holding that it does not constitute
a valid and knowing surrender of the constitutional right to due proc-
ess. 1 43  Similarly, a district court in Mississippi followed Fuentes and
139. CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS Gums 52,070, 12 UCC REP. SERv. 543
(D.C. Vt., Nov. 1, 1972).
140. In regard to due process, Fuentes is fairly particular in its holding that
before an individual can be deprived of his property by an action of the state, he must
be given reasonable notice of the action and afforded a hearing prior to the seizure at
which he may voice his objections. Some of the cases holding repossession constitu-
tional, however, have distinguished Fuentes to avoid following its dictates.
Messenger v. Sandy Motor, Inc., 295 A.2d 402, 121 N.J. Super. 1 (1972), for exam-
ple, held that due process was satisfied, apparently on a theory of waiver, Fuentes
had refused to allow a waiver, but the Messenger court distinguished car and stereo re-
possessions inasmuch as everyone who buys a par on time knows that it will be re-
possessed if the payments aren't made.
Judge Weisberger, in Plante v. Industrial Nat'l Bank of Rhode Island, CCH
SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE f 52,186, 12 UCC REP. SERV. 739 (R.I. Superior Ct.,
April 4, 1973) held that he wouldn't extend Fuentes "one millimeter beyond the
requirements of that case as enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States."
12 UCC REP. SERV. at 742.
141. See Fuentes, 92 S. Ct. at 1999-2001. The spirit of Sniadach and Fuentes
compels a conclusion that such a holding is valid. If a creditor had reasonable
grounds to believe that the debtor will destroy or conceal the collateral, he could obtain
a court order authorizing seizure, thus eliminating the need for summary repossession.
142. Accord, Nowlin v. Professional Auto Sales, Inc., CCH POVERTY L. REP.
16,202 (D.C. Neb., June 29, 1972) (temporary restraining order issued; debtor to
resume installment payments); Zacharias v. Western Pennsylvania Nat'l Bank, CCH
POVERTY L. REP. 16,352 (D.W.D. Pa., Aug. 29, 1972) (restraining order issued;
debtor ordered to post bond).
143. Compare Fuentes, 92 S. Ct. at 2001-02, citing Overmyer v. Frick, 405 U.S. 174
(1972), with Michel v. Rex-Noreco, Inc., 12 UCC REP. SERV. at 547.
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held UCC Section 9-503 unconstitutional in James v. Pinnix.'"
Perhaps the most novel holding was that of a New York trial
court faced with the traditional case of a creditor suing a debtor for
a deficiency judgment after the repossessed car's sale failed to cover
the amount of the loan.' 45  In Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Dinitz,1
46
Judge Cooper denied recovery of the deficiency judgment because the
secured party failed to afford the debtor the constitutional right of due
process before seizure as set forth in Fuentes.
Although many district and state courts have decided the consti-
tutional question of repossession, at this time only one United States
circuit court has considered the matter on appeal. As mentioned ear-
lier, the district courts in northern and southern California came to
opposite conclusions. 14 7 The split was mended when the Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit heard Adams on appeal sub. nom. Adams
v. Southern California First National Bank.148  Reversing, the Ninth
Circuit held repossession under UCC Section 9-503 constitutional be-
cause it could not find significant state action to trigger the fourteenth
amendment due process clause and establish a federal cause of action.
Circuit Judge Trask's opinion hammered upon the arguments utilized
in the prior cases, always demonstrating that in the opinion of the
Ninth Circuit, state action means significant state action, not any state
action, as argued by the plaintiffs, in which the state is involved only
through the passive codification of a statute. It seems as though the
"significant" v. "any" state action question will be raised in future
cases on repossession because it frames the issue in terms of "relative"
rather than "absolute" so well.
The Supreme Court will certainly hear a case on repossession
within the next few terms. At least two possible alternatives logically
present themselves. First, the Supreme Court could determine that
there is no, or an insignificant amount of state action involved, and
dismiss the case for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. The second alternative would be to find state action, and
then analyze repossession in light of Fuentes. Fuentes, it should be
remembered, did not strike down all prejudgment replevin statutes. It
could well mean that the replevin statutes under consideration were
144. CCH SECURED TRANSACIONS GumE 52,172 (D.C.S.D. Miss., Feb. 14, 1973).
145. For an explanation of the deficiency judgment controversy, see Spak, Secured
Transactions, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 177, 188 (1972), especially n.20.
146. CCH SECURED TR.ISACTIONS GUIDE 1 52,007 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Kings Co., Oct.
26, 1972).
147. Adams v. Egley, 338 F. Supp. 614, 617 (S.D. Cal. 1972); Oiler v. Bank of
America, 342 F. Supp. 21 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
148. CCH SECURED TRANSACTIONS GUIDE, 51,773 (9th Cir., Oct. 4, 1973).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
too broad. A proper replevin procedure, according to the majority
opinion, would have a pre-seizure hearing except in those cases involv-
ing "extraordinary situations", such as those cases "in which a creditor
could make a showing of immediate danger that a debtor will destroy
or conceal disputed goods."' 49  In those cases, the creditor can have
the property summarily seized.
Illinois enacted a new replevin law5 0 to conform to Fuentes.
It provides that a defendant in a replevin action be given five days
notice of a hearing to contest the issuance of a writ of replevin. Also
in conformance with Fuentes, it provides that a plaintiff may appear
before a court in an ex parte hearing and a writ of replevin may sum-
marily issue upon a showing by the plaintiff that he will suffer "im-
149. 92 S. Ct. at 2001.
150. P.A. 78-287, effective August 13, 1973, amending ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119,
§ 1-21. The relevant sections are § 4a and § 4b. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, § 4a:
The defendant shall be given 5 days written notice in the manner required by
Rule of the Supreme Court, of a hearing before the Court to contest the issu-
ance of a writ of replevin. No writ of replevin may issue nor may property
be seized pursuant to a writ of replevin prior to such notice and hearing except
as provided in Section 4b.
As to any particular property, the right to notice and hearing estab-
lished in this Section may not be waived by any consumer. As used in this
section, a consumer is an individual who obtained possession of the property
for personal, family, household, or agricultural purposes.
Any waiver of the right to notice and hearing established in this Sec-
tion must be in writing and must be given voluntarily, intelligently, and
knowingly.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 119, § 4b:
Notice to the defendant is not required if the plaintiff establishes and the
court finds as a matter of record and supported by evidence that summary
seizure of the property is justified by reason of necessity to:
(a) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which
will result from the imminent destruction or concealment of the disputed
property in derogation of the plaintiffs' rights in the property;
(b) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which
will result from the imminent removal of the disputed property from the
state, taking into consideration the availability of judicial remedies in the
event of the removal;
(c) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which
will result from the perishable nature of the disputed property under the
particular circumstances at the time of the action;
(d) protect the plaintiff from an immediately impending harm which
will result from the imminent sale, transfer or assignment of the disputed
property to the extent such sale, transfer or assignment is fraudulent or in
derogation of the plaintiff's rights in the property;
(e) recover the property from a defendant who has obtained posses-
sion by theft.
At an ex parte hearing to determine if notice is not required, the court
shall examine the evidence on each element required by this section or any
written waiver of rights presented by the plaintiff. If the court finds that no-
tice is not required, or that the waiver is in accordance with law, it shall
order a hearing as soon as practicable on the issuance of the writ of replevin.
Of interest is the provision in § 4a that a consumer may not waive his right to notice
and a hearing.
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mediately impending harm", such as by destruction, concealment, re-
moval from the state, perishing, or sale of the disputed property. Thus,
in a procedure similar to that required for the granting of a search
warrant, a writ of replevin may be summarily granted and still not
violate due process.
A political Supreme Court could certainly apply the Fuentes deci-
sion to repossession by self-help and still not terminate the right of
repossession. The Supreme Court could decide that UCC Section 9-
503 violates due process, because of its "overbreadth" inasmuch as
it allows indiscriminate prejudgment repossessions. Then, the way
would be open for states to pass laws allowing repossessions only in
cases where, such as in the words of the Illinois replevin statute, "im-
mediately impending harm" would ensue. In those situations, the se-
cured creditor could appear before a judge ex parte to prove that the
collateral is in danger and should be seized by self-help immediately,
or provisions could be made for the posting of a bond by the repos-
sessor to protect the debtor in the event of mistake by the repossessor.
In any event, a post-seizure hearing would be held to determine title,
exactly the same as the old replevin action. In all other situations,
the secured creditor could proceed under the new replevin action, pro-
viding notice of a pre-seizure hearing.
The advantages of the modified repossession scheme are compell-
ing, especially in the light of what the Fuentes dissent labeled "the
practical considerations involved." 15' In the usual default situation,
the secured creditor seeks satisfaction before he decides to repossess
the collateral. In many cases, the debtor realizes his inability to pay
and tells the creditor to take the goods away. In Messenger v. Sandy
Motors, Inc.,' 52 the court related the testimony of a witness who said
that out of 235 repossessions by his bank, 120 were voluntary. It
is safe to assume that the voluntarily repossessed debtors would not
contest a replevin action; in fact, there would be no need for a hearing
if they surrendered the collateral.
Out of the remaining 115 debtors who did not voluntarily surren-
er the collateral upon default, it can be assumed that at least two
different types of debtors can be discerned. First, there will be some
who will be prone to conceal, sell, or otherwise dispose of the collateral.
The secured creditor would already know the identity of these problem
accounts, so he could summarily repossess upon default, according to
151. 92 S. Ct. at 2004.
152. 295 A.2d 402, 407, 121 N.J. Super. 1 (1972).
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the modified scheme. Second, the remaining type of debtor may not
voluntarily return the collateral, but he will not actively prevent its
repossession. In these cases, there is no danger in the debtor remain-
ing in possession for the week or so until the hearing can be held.
As noted, repossession of collateral by self-help need not be exer-
cised indiscriminately. Rather, the same results could be obtained by
reserving its use for those cases where there is a danger of loss to the col-
lateral. In all other cases, the debtors could be given the opportunity
for a pre-seizure hearing without loss to the creditors.
In passing, it is relatively certain that "Illinois' own" Mojica v.
Automatic Employees Credit Union,'53 decided by a federal three-
judge panel in the Northern District of Illinois, will not be the reposses-
sion case heard by the Supreme Court. Therein, the plaintiffs alleged
that their autos were seized while they were not yet in default. There-
fore, the panel's memorandum opinion dismissed the complaint because
it asked the court to determine the validity of a statute improperly
applied. Had the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs were in default,
the panel consisting of Chief Circuit Judge Swygert and District Judges
Austin and McGarr probably would have heard the case on its merits
and then the case could have moved swiftly to the Supreme Court
for a decision.
CONCLUSION
In the recent past, the protection of due process was not avail-
able to debtors in many instances. With the landmark decisions in
Sniadach and Fuentes, the Supreme Court has sought to prevent
wrongful takings by requiring notice and a hearing before the seizure
of property from debtors by creditors. The final frontier is reposses-
sion by self-help as authorized by UCC Section 9-503, which is pres-
ently being challenged in the lower courts without much success. Hope-
fully, the Supreme Court will continue the trend and strike down arbi-
trary repossession by secured creditors without the benefits of due proc-
ess. This hope, however, should be tempered by an understanding
of the composition of the Court.,
4
153. No. 77 C 686, August 16, 1973.
154. It should be noted that Justices Powell and Relmquist, who did not sit for
Fuentes, may very well join the Fuentes dissent in holding repossession to be consti-
tutional.
